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Highlights
• We propose to model the probability of bank failure with the GEV model.
• We propose to model the probability of receiving capital injections with GEV model.
• We propose the longitudinal binary generalised extreme value (LOBGEV).
• The temporal structure of the probability of failure is modelled by the LOBGEV.
• A unique dataset on the Troubled Asset Relief Program is analysed.
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Abstract
Following the 2008 financial crisis, regulatory authorities and governments provided
distressed banks with equity infusions in order to strengthen national banking systems.
However, the effectiveness of these interventions for financial stability has not been ex-
tensively researched in the literature. In order to understand the effectiveness of these
bailouts for the solvency of banks this paper proposes a new model: the Longitudi-
nal Binary Generalised Extreme Value (LOBGEV) model. Differing from the existing
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models, the LOBGEV model allows us to analyse the temporal structure of the prob-
ability of failure for banks, for both those that received a bailout and for those that
did not. In particular, it encompasses both the flexibility of the D-vine copula and the
accuracy of the generalised extreme value model in estimating the probability of bank
failure and of banks receiving approval for capital injection. We apply this new model
to the US banking system from 2008 to 2013 in order to investigate how and to what
extent the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)- Capital Purchase Program (CPP)
reduced the probability of the failure of commercial banks. We specifically identify a set
of macroeconomic and bank-specific factors that affect the probability of bank failure
for TARP-CCP recipients and for those that did not receive capital under TARP-CCP.
Our results suggest that TARP-CPP provided only short-term relief for US commercial
banks.
Keywords: Binary data, D-vine copula model, Banking, TARP-CPP, Failure.
1 Introduction
Monitoring and evaluating banking stability is an important and reoccurring theme on
the agenda of policy makers. A number of recent influential studies have contributed
to the analysis of systemic banking crises in the operational research literature (see
for a literature review Kumar & Ravi, 2007; Fethi & Pasiouras, 2010; Demyanyk &
Hasan, 2010; Ioannidis et al., 2010). These studies on distressed banks develop models
that detect risky banks prior to failure. They also attempt to identify banks for which
regulatory authorities may have to take corrective actions (DeYoung & Torna, 2013).
However, little attention has been devoted so far to the analysis of the effectiveness
of bailouts for the stability of a banking system. An understanding of this subject
is important in order to minimize the cost of failure and rescue for stakeholders and
taxpayers.
At present, this issue is of great concern for policy makers and researchers because
of the peculiarities of the 2008 financial crisis. Compared to the past, the financial
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crisis led to extraordinary policy interventions in terms of both the range of policy
measures adopted, the speed and scale of the interventions, and the implementation of
those resolutions (Laeven & Valencia, 2010). Starting from the onset of the financial
crisis, US and EU regulatory authorities or governments bailed-out numerous commercial
and investment banks in order to reduce the fragility of the banking system and to
restore confidence in the financial markets. During this time, several financial institutions
failed. These events led to a proliferation of new studies on the determinants and the
consequences of bank failures and bailouts (e.g. Demyanyk & Hasan, 2010; Dam &
Koetter, 2012; Bayazitova & Shivdasani, 2012; Cole & White, 2012; Berger & Bouwman,
2013; Calderon & Schaeck, 2015). While the availability of government safety nets and
rapid intervention policies can have beneficial effects in resolving crises, their use is
not free from criticism. Implicit and explicit guarantees can strengthen the perception
that big-banks will be bailed-out if they find themselves in a distressed situation, thus
encouraging moral hazard behaviour (Hakenes & Schnabel, 2010), thereby decreasing
the stability of the banking system. Consequently, understanding whether regulatory
interventions and capital support enhance banking stability is critical for regulatory
authorities and policymakers.
From a statistical perspective, many relevant theoretical and empirical contributions
to this topic employ the use of logistic (e.g. Bayazitova & Shivdasani, 2012; Cole &
White, 2012; Berger & Bouwman, 2013) or probit models (Croci et al., 2015). However,
the use of probit and logit link is not appropriate when modelling rare events. If we
classify the rare events as ones, the major drawback of these approaches is that they
underestimate the probability of binary rare events for values close to one, such as
bank defaults or bail-outs (Calabrese & Osmetti, 2015; King & Zeng, 2001; Wang &
Dey, 2010). To overcome this limitation, a model has been proposed in the operational
research literature (Andreeva et al., 2016; Calabrese & Osmetti, 2013; Marra et al., 2014;
Calabrese & Osmetti, 2015) - the Binary Generalised Extreme Value Additive model,
BGEVA (GEV model in the parametric form). This approach is particularly suitable for
binary rare events data, i.e. when the observed number of ones in the sample is very low.
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In particular, the BGEVA model has been proven to outperform the logistic regression
model when predicting failure events, such as bank and firm defaults.
This paper adds to the operational and banking literature by proposing a new model
that enables us to measure the effectiveness of bailout interventions for the financial
stability of banks. Specifically, the aim of this paper is to develop a statistical tool to
better analyse and monitor (i) the probability of default depending on bailouts over
time; and (ii) the temporal dependence structure of the probability of the failure of a
bank.
From a methodological viewpoint, this paper contributes to the operational research
literature in three ways. First, we estimate the probability of bank distress and the
probability of being bailed out using the GEV model. Calabrese & Giudici (2015) show
the advantages of the GEV model in their study of distressed Italian banks. Second, we
analyse the effects of a bailout over time on a bank’s probability of default. To achieve
this, we develop an extension of the GEV model for use with longitudinal data. We call
this new model the Longitudinal Binary Generalised Extreme value (LOBGEV) model.
Third, we employ the LOBGEV to analyse the temporal dependence structure of the
probability of failure for banks that either received or did not receive ad-hoc bailouts.
This enables us to analyse how and to what extent bailouts were effective in reducing
the probability of default for banks.
Several models have been proposed for correlated responses (outcomes) in longitudi-
nal data (see for example Arellano & Bo, 2001). For modelling the time dependence in
longitudinal data, in this paper we choose a copula approach, analogously to Smith et al.
(2010) and Meade & Islam (2010), because it is a simple method to estimate multivari-
ate models when the marginal responses are given. Furthermore, the copula approach is
particularly suitable to model different kinds of dependence structures. In addition, the
copula approach has been used in the regression framework for continuous and discrete
data. For example Koleva & Paivab (2009) use a bivariate copula to model the depen-
dence between errors. Radice et al. (2015) suggest a copula-based regression model for
binary outcomes using a parametric copula, such as Clayton, Gumbel, Frank, Joe and
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Student-t. Furthermore, Kraemer et al. (2013) propose a bivariate regression model for
total loss estimation by combining marginal generalised linear models for continuous and
discrete variables with a copula approach.
In this paper we consider a drawable vine (D-vine) copula as it is an extremely
flexible representation of a multivariate distribution that uses bivariate copula densities
(pair-copula) in a hierarchical approach as in Smith et al. (2010) and Smith (2015).
In the D-vine copula approach, the multivariate probability density function is decom-
posed into pair-copulae that can be chosen independently from each other, generating a
less flexible multivariate dependence structure. On the contrary, the multivariate cop-
ula models largely used in the literature, such as multivariate Archimedian, Gaussian,
Gumbel, Clayton and Joe, have the same dependence structure for each pair-copulae.
Moreover, the D-vine copula approach is suitable for modelling longitudinal data and to
represent the dependence structure over time (Smith et al., 2010; Smith, 2015). For all
these reasons, we use a D-vine copula approach to model the time series of the failure
probabilities, previously estimated by using the GEV model. We define this method as
LOBGEV model.
We apply the proposed methodology to the US banking market, which is a suitable
case for our analysis for several reasons. Starting from October 2008, the US Treasury
utilized several initiatives under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) to stabilise
the US financial system, to spur economic growth, and to prevent unnecessary foreclo-
sures. In line with recent studies (see for example Bayazitova & Shivdasani, 2012; Berger
& Roman, 2015; Duchin & Sosyura, 2014), we focus on the Capital Purchase Program
(CPP), the largest bank bailout programme under TARP launched by the Treasury.
Under the TARP-CPP, the Treasury provided capital to 707 financial institutions
in 48 states, a total investment of approximately $205 billion between October 2008
and December 2009. 174 of these financial institutions missed one or more TARP-
CPP dividends, and 29 of them went bankrupt. Moreover, many of the small banks
that received capital injections (372 out of 656 banks benefiting from preferred stocks
investments) were hesitant to exit the programme (Wilson, 2013), raising doubts about
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their long-term viability. This means that there were banks that failed despite the fact
that they received capital injections. In addition, from September 2008 to September
2014 more than 500 banks were resolved by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC)1. We consider this resolution process as a default event.
From an empirical viewpoint, this is, to the best of our knowledge, the first paper
that examines the effectiveness of the TARP-CPP programme on the temporal structure
of banks’ default probabilities. Previous papers mainly focus on the effects of the TARP-
CPP on the risk-taking and moral hazard behaviour of banks (Dam & Koetter, 2012;
Black & Hazelwood, 2013; Duchin & Sosyura, 2014), the performance of banks (Croci
et al., 2015), the distortion of competition in the US banking market (Berger & Roman,
2015), and financial and stock price recovery (Liu et al., 2013). So far, Croci et al. (2015)
is the only study that compares the probabilities of failure for banks that received capital
injections under TARP-CPP and for those that did not. We extend this literature by
proposing a new model to assess the temporal structure of the effects generated by
capital injection. In this analysis, we find evidence that the TARP-CPP programme
helped banks to reduce their default probabilities in the short term.
We organise the rest of the paper as follows. The next section reviews the literature
on the probability of bank failures and capital injections. Following this, we propose a
longitudinal model for binary rare events. The fourth section describes the data and the
empirical results, with the fifth and final section stating and describing our conclusions.
2 An overview of recent studies on banks’ bailout
and failure
There is a growing amount of literature on the 2008 financial crisis, specifically its
effects on the US banking system. A number of these studies have investigated the
likelihood of bank failures in the US during and after the financial crisis (e.g. Cole &
White, 2012; Berger & Bouwman, 2013; DeYoung & Torna, 2013; Croci et al., 2015).
1Retrieved from https://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html, September 2014.
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These authors evaluate a bank’s performance using the CAMEL (the acronyms stands
for Capital, Asset quality, Management, Earnings, and Liquidity) model that is widely
utilized by credit rating agencies and regulators. Their findings suggest that low asset
quality (non-performing loans), high concentration of business or commercial real estate
loans, illiquidity, cost inefficiency, rapid asset growth, dependence on non-core deposit
funding and both low profitability and capitalisation are key variables in predicting the
probability of the failure of a bank.
More recent studies have focused on the probability of receiving capital injections in
the US banking sector during the financial crisis. For example, Bayazitova & Shivdasani
(2012) analyse the likelihood of a bank receiving CPP capital injections. The authors
show that wholesale debt, Tier 1 ratio capital and commercial loans are all factors that
can predict if a bank participates in the programme. They also point out that large banks
are more likely to receive capital under the TARP-CPP. Croci et al. (2015) find that
commercial and industrial loans, credit risk, non-performing loans, cost inefficiencies,
goodwill and size can enhance the probability of receiving capital under the TARP-
CPP.
Additionally, a number of studies have focused on the effects of policy interventions
for banks. However, despite this research, it is not still entirely clear how and to what
extent policy interventions are effective in ensuring the stability of the banking system.
Interventions may reduce the probability of insolvency in the short-term, but they may
also create a distortion of competition and provide incentives for misleading behaviour.
In this regards, recent papers (e.g. Gropp et al., 2011; Black & Hazelwood, 2013; Calderon
& Schaeck, 2015) have shown that bailouts can increase the moral hazard behaviour
of banks when monitoring incentives are distorted. In addition, Berger et al. (2014))
demonstrate that bailouts can lead to inappropriate loan pricing and the granting of
loans to riskier borrowers. Furthermore, Duchin & Sosyura (2014) point out that banks
increased the risk profile of both their lending activities and their portfolio investments
after being enrolled in the TARP-CPP programme. In contrast, Koetter & Noth (2015)
find that higher bailout probabilities are not associated with moral hazard of banks, but
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that instead, banks with a higher likelihood of being bailed-out engaged in less risky
behaviour. Berger & Roman (2015) provides evidence of TARP-banks increasing their
market share and market power relative to non-TARP banks. More recently, Croci et al.
(2015) has shown that bailing-out more banks would have been cost-efficient and would
have reduced the number of banks that went through the FDIC resolution process. So
far, this is the only paper that we aware of that has analysed the probability of default
of banks that received a bailout. The authors however still make use of the probit model
that, as mentioned earlier, has some fundamental drawbacks. Given this evidence, it
is clear that the debate on the effects of bailouts on the risk profile of banks is still on
going. So far, the impact of policy interventions on the dependence structure of the
distress probabilities of banks over time has been overlooked. We therefore bridge this
gap by proposing a new model that estimates the influence of the capital injections over
time on the dependence structure of the distress probabilities.
3 Methodology
In this paper we propose a longitudinal model in order to evaluate the changes in the
probabilities of failure over a period of time. Specifically, we propose a GEV longitudinal
model (LOBGEV) by combining the GEV model and the D-vine copula. The proposed
model has two levels of analysis. First, we make use of the GEV model because it has
been proposed for improving the classification accuracy of the commonly used logistic
and probit models for strongly unbalanced samples. The GEV model, described in the
following section, is used to estimate the probability of bank distress and the probability
of being bailed out at each time t. Second, the dependence across the probabilities of
failure over time is modelled by a multivariate copula. Given its flexibility, we choose a
D-vine copula approach, described in Section 3.2.
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3.1 GEV model
Let Yt be a response variable that describes at time t a binary rare event, i.e. binary
dependent variable with a very small number of one than zero. We will be interested
in predicting the probability pit = P (Yt = 1|xt−1) given values of covariate vector x at
time t− 1.
The usually statistical models for binary response variable, like the logistic regression
model, present several drawbacks in rare event studies. In particular, rare events have
proven difficult to predict. When the data is in fact unbalanced, the estimate of the
dependent variable tends to be biased towards the majority class, which is usually the
less important class to correctly predict (King & Zeng, 2001). Specifically, the use of a
symmetric link function, such as the logit or probit function, may underestimate pit for
the rare events {Yt = 1}, as the response curve pit approaches zero at the same rate as it
approaches one (King & Zeng, 2001; Wang & Dey, 2010; Marra et al., 2014; Calabrese
& Osmetti, 2013).
To overcome these drawbacks Calabrese & Osmetti (2013) propose a new flexible
GLM for predicting binary rare events. If we assume that the rare events are the out-
comes {Yt = 1}2, their features are represented by the tail of the response curve for
values close to one. As the GEV random variable is used in the literature (Falk et al.,
2010) to model the tail of a distribution, Calabrese & Osmetti (2013) consider a flexible
skewed link function based on the GEV distribution. The proposed model is a very
flexible parametric model, particularly suitable to model binary rare event data:
[− ln(pit)]−τ − 1
τ
= α+
p∑
k=1
βkxt−1,k, (3.1)
where pit = P (Yt = 1|xt−1) is the probability of the event (Yt = 1) at time t and where
xt−1 = (x1, x2, ..., xp) is the vector of p covariates observed at time t − 1. Calabrese &
Osmetti (2015) propose the BGEVA model by including an additive component to the
GEV model. The BGEVA model has been then improved by Calabrese et al. (2016).
2The GEV model is suitable also if the rare events are the outcomes {Yt = 0} as the GEV link function
can be left or right skewed.
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Several studies (Andreeva et al., 2016; Calabrese et al., 2016; Calabrese & Osmetti, 2015,
2013) have shown that the GEV model outperforms the logistic and the probit models
even if the percentage of ones in the sample is one percent.
In this paper, we use the GEV model for different purposes. First, we estimate the
banks’ failure probability in 2008 to analyse the characteristics relevant to explain banks’
distress in the pre-intervention period. Second, we apply the GEV model to evaluate
the probability of receiving capital injections in 2008 and 2009. Third, we estimate the
probability of failure conditionally to the event ”a bank receives a capital injection”
(I = 1) and ”a bank does not receive any capital injection” (I = 0) during the post-
intervention period (2010-2013). Therefore, let Yt be the binary r.v.such that (Yt = 1)
is a banks failed at time t. We apply the model in equation (3.1) at each time (from
2010 to 2013) to estimate both conditional probabilities of failure P (Yt = 1|I = 1) and
P (Yt = 1|I = 0). In this way we are able to analyse how and to what extent the impact
of the covariates changes over the time.
3.2 The D-vine copula
Definition 3.1 (Multivariate copula). The copula is a multivariate cumulative distribu-
tion function (cdf) with U1, U2, ..., Ud uniformly distributed marginals random variables
on I = [0, 1]:
C(u1, u2, ..., ud) = P (U1 ≤ u1, U2 ≤ u2, ..., Ud ≤ ud)
The importance of copulae in statistical modelling stems from Sklar’s theorem which
shows that every multivariate distribution can be represented via the choice of an ap-
propriate copula and it provides a general mechanism to construct multivariate models
in a straightforward manner.
Theorem 3.1 (Sklar). Let X1, ..., Xd be a set of random variables with joint cdf F (·)
and marginals cumulative distribution functions (cdfs) F1(·), F2(·), .., Fd(·). It exists a
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copula function C : Id → I such that ∀x1, x2, ..., xd ∈ Rd
F (x1, ..., xd) = C(F1(x1), ..., Fd(xd)). (3.2)
If F1(·), F2(·), .., Fd(·) are continuous functions then the copula C(·) is unique. Con-
versely, if C(·) is a copula function and F1(·), F2(·), .., Fd(·) are marginal cdfs, then the
F (x1, ..., xd) in (3.2) is a multivariate cdf.
The principal advantage to use a copula approach follows from the Sklar theorem.
This theorem states that each joint distribution can be expressed in terms of marginal
distributions and a copula function that captures the dependence structure between the
marginal probabilities. The main advantages of the copula approach are that it is a
simple method to estimate multivariate models for given marginal distribution functions
and it can represent different kinds of dependence structures. Simpler models usually
assume a linear dependence, such as the multivariate normal distribution, or linear tail
dependence, such as the multivariate Student-t. On the contrary, the copula model can
account for non-linear dependence or non-linear upper/lower tail dependence.
In high dimensions, multivariate copula-based models have been employed largely to
account for complex dependence structure in order to consider non-normality assumption
(Joe, 1997; Whelan, 2004; Savu & Trede, 2010). In the recent literature, the multivariate
probability density function has been composed into the product of bivariate copulae,
also known as pair-copulae, that can be chosen independently from each other from a
wide class of bivariate copulae. In order to represent the dependence structure between
the pair-copulae, a graphical model is used. The resulting approach is known as vine
copulae (Czado, 2010). A goodness of fit test can be performed to choose the combi-
nation of the pair-copulae that best fits to data. Smith et al. (2010); Smith (2015) and
Panagiotelis et al. (2012) use a vine-copula approach to model the dependence struc-
ture for longitudinal data and have shown encouraging results on the goodness of fit
achieved in an empirical analysis on headache severity. Different vine decomposition,
such as regular-vine (R-vine), canonical-vine (C-vine) and drawable vine (D-vine), have
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been proposed to describe specific dependence between the variables. Aas et al. (2009)
and Czado (2010) extensively explain the main differences among R-vines, C-vines and
D-vines. Bedford & Cooke (2002) propose the D-vine copula for modelling time series.
As the aim of this paper is to model the failure probability of banks over time, we use the
D-vine copula approach for their flexibility and parsimony. We do not use multivariate
copula families, such as multivariate Clayton, Gumbel, Frank, Gaussian and Student-t
copula, because, if we decompose these families in pair-copulae, they all need to belong
to the same copula family, showing the same dependence structure. The condition that
the dependence structure is invariant over time is seldom satisfied by longitudinal data.
This assumption is instead removed in the D-vine copula approach (Smith et al. (2010)
and Smith (2015)). Coherently, several simulation and empirical studies for continuous
and discrete data (e.g. Aas & Berg, 2009; Smith et al., 2010; Smith & Khaled, 2012;
Kraemer et al., 2013; Panagiotelis et al., 2012) have shown that the D-vine copula can
achieve a higher goodness of fit than the multivariate copulae, such as Clayton, Gumbel
and Gaussian.
The D-vine copula approach has previously been applied in several fields. For ex-
ample, D-vine has been used to forecast electricity load (see Smith et al., 2010) and
to model the dependence structure between the amounts of precipitation over time in
several geographic areas (see Daeyoung et al., 2013). In finance, Aas & Berg (2009) use
them to model the time series of financial log-returns.
We describe the D-vine model for continuous data. Let (X1, X2, ..., XT ) be an univari-
ate time series of continuously distributed data observed at T possibly unequally spaced
points in time, the joint density function f(x1, x2, ..., xT ) can be always decomposed in
a product of the conditional (to the past) distributions:
f(x1, x2, ..., xT ) =
T∏
t=2
f(xt|xt−1, ..., x1)f(x1).
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By using a pair-copula (bivariate copula) representation we have:
f(xt|xt−1, ..., x1) =
t−1∏
j=1
ct,j [F (xt|xt−1, ..., xj+1), F (xj |xt−1, ..., xj+1); θt,j ]f(xt)
where F (xt|·) is the cdf of Xt conditional to the past, f(xt) is the density function of
the marginal Xt and ct,j = ct,j|t−1,t−2,...,j+1 is the pair-copula density with association
parameters θt,j between the variables Xt and Xj conditional to the times from j + 1 to
t− 1 (see Smith et al. (2010) for details).
Therefore, the joint distribution of the process becomes a D-vine copula model of
order T , which is a product of T marginal densities and T (T−1)/2 pair-copula densities:
f(x1, x2, ..., xT ) =
T∏
t=2
t−1∏
j=1
ct,j(ut|j+1, uj|t−1; θt,s)f(xt)
 f(x1), (3.3)
where ut|j+1 = F (xt|xt−1, ..., xj+1) and uj|t−1 = F (xj |xt−1, ..., xj+1).
3.3 Longitudinal Binary Generalised Extreme Value (LOBGEV)
model
Let pi1, pi2, ..., piT be the univariate series of failure probabilities modelled by the GEV
model in equation (3.1). We define the joint probability of failures over the periods
t = 1, ..., T by a copula representation as in equation (3.2):
P (Y1 = 1, Y2 = 1, ..., YT = 1) = C(pi1, pi2, ..., pit, ..., piT ).
This representation allows modelling the temporal dependence across the probabil-
ities of failure. Let c be the copula density function of the copula C. Following a
procedure similar to the one described for the D-vine model in the previous section, the
copula density function c(pi1, pi2, ..., piT ) can be decomposed in a product of the condi-
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tional (to the past) pair-copula density functions:
c(pi1, pi2, ..., piT ) =
T∏
t=2
t−1∏
j=1
ct,j(ut|j+1, uj|t−1; θt,j)
 (3.4)
where ct,j = ct,j|t−1,t−2,...,j+1 is the pair-copula with association parameters θt,j between
pit and pij conditional to the times from j + 1 to t− 1 and ut|j+1 = pit|pit−1, ..., pij+1 and
uj|t−1 = pij |pit−1, ..., pij+1.
Therefore, the joint distribution of the process becomes a D-vine copula model of or-
der T , which is a product of T marginal densities and T (T − 1)/2 pair-copula densities.
We call this model Longitudinal Binary Generalised Extreme Value model (LOBGEV).
Since the LOBGEV is based on copula function, it could be different from the longitudi-
nal model usually based on normal distribution and its dependence structure could not
be linear. In this way, a flexible, parsimonious and not necessary normal longitudinal
model for banks’ probabilities of failing is proposed.
4 Empirical evidence
4.1 Data
The data on TARP-CPP comes from the U.S. Department of the Treasury, while the
data on FDIC auctions are retrieved from the FDIC website. The accounting data are
retrieved from the Federal Reserves Reports of Condition and Income (Call Reports)
for commercial banks on a quarterly basis from the first quarter in 2007 to the third
quarter in 2013. Call reports data for commercial banks were downloaded from the
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’ s website3 (starting from March 2011). Analogously
to Croci et al. (2015), we focus our analysis on commercial banks. As concerns the
macroeconomic variables, the data on gross domestic product per capita (GDP) and
the personal income growth rate come from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA),
while those on the unemployment rate from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area
3https : //cdr.ffiec.gov/public/
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Unemployment Statistics4.
We consider as a distress event, the failure of a bank under the resolution of the
FDIC. Specifically, a bank can be resolved by the FDIC under three different types of
transaction: (i) assistance transactions where the failed / assisted institution remains
open and its charter survives the resolution process; (ii) purchase and assumption trans-
actions where the failed / assisted institution’s insured deposits are transferred to a
successor institution, and its charter is closed; and (iii) payoff transactions, the deposit
insurer - the FDIC or the former Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation - pays
insured depositors, the failed / assisted institution’s charter is closed, and there is no
successor institution5. In this paper, we do not make a distinction between these three
categories.
Year
TARP-CPP banks banks not included in TARP-CPP
Total
Failing Non-failing Failing Non-failing
2008 0 272 12 6,831 7,115
2009 3 523 140 6,449 7,115
Year Failing Failing Total
2010 5 157 6,790
2011 9 92 6,721
2012 9 49 6,329
2013 3 59 6,048
Table 1: Distribution of banks’ failures from 2008 to 2013 in the US.
Table 1 shows the distribution of failures from 2008 to 2013 for the US banks in the
data. The number of failings over time shows different patterns for banks that received
capital injection and those that did not receive such support. In the first group, the
banks in distress achieve their maximum in 2011 and 2012, in the second group earlier
in 2010.
4The data are available on the following website: http : //www.bea.gov/iTable/indexregional.cfm and
http : //www.bls.gov/lau/data.htm
5See https://www.fdic.gov/ for more details.
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4.2 Determinants of capital injection and banks’ failures
In this section we analyse the determinants of banks’ failures and receiving capital in-
jections for the years 2008 and 2009. Additionally, we compare the covariates of the
probability of distress for both the banks that were enrolled in the TARP CPP pro-
gramme and did not receive any capital injection. In order to identify the explanatory
variables of the GEV model for each year from 2008 to 2013, we follow the CAMEL
framework in the line with previous studies (e.g. Wheelock & Wilson, 2000; Rossi, 2010;
Cole & White, 2012; Dam & Koetter, 2012; Berger & Bouwman, 2013; Calabrese &
Giudici, 2015).
Our model consists of a combination of variables that previous and recent studies
have identified to be relevant for the prediction of a bank failure or bailout during the
2008-2009 financial crisis. In particular, in accordance with Dam & Koetter (2012) and
Cole & White (2012) we include equity-to-asset ratio, total loans/total assets, other
real estate owned/total assets, cost inefficiency, liquidity, size and holding companies in
our model. We expect cost inefficiency to have a direct influence on the likelihood of
a bank’s failing. Since other real estate owned/total assets have been extraordinarily
risky for banks in the past, we expect this variable to impact directly on failure. In
addition, consistent with Wheelock & Wilson (2000), a positive value for the liquidity
variable could lead to the possibility of liquidity problems for a bank. Banks with a
liquidity problem are more likely to fail. Therefore, we expect that liquidity has a direct
effect on the probability of failure of a bank. In contract, the level of capitalization,
size and being part of a holding company should show an inverse relationship on the
likelihood of failure. As maintained by Berger & Bouwman (2013), membership of a
bank holding company should reduce the probability of failure because it strengthens
its competitive position as a consequence of the capital support provided by the holding
company. Furthermore, as suggested by Calabrese & Giudici (2015), we also add Tier
1 capital ratio and performance as predictors of bank failure to our model. We explain
that we expect these variables to have an inverse relationship with the likelihood of a
bank failing.
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Next, drawing on the US literature (e.g. Cole & White, 2012; Croci et al., 2015), we
select commercial and industrial loans as a key variable to predict banks’ failure during
the recent financial crisis. We also take into account the brokered deposit over total
and non-interest income over both operating income and total assets asset following
Berger & Bouwman (2013) and DeYoung & Torna (2013). Both these variables appear
to be important determinants of bank failure during the recent crisis as they are related
either to high-risk activities or to trading positions that are easy to change but difficult
to monitor. Finally, we acknowledge the importance of local and regional economic
conditions. In this regard, we explain that in accordance with Koetter et al. (2007) and
Arena (2008) we include gross domestic product per capita (GDP), the unemployment
rate and the personal income growth rate in our model. In the same manner, a few recent
studies have focused on probability of capital injections in the US banking sector during
the recent 2007-2009 financial crisis. Specifically, Bayazitova & Shivdasani (2012) analyse
the likelihood of banks’ application for CPP capital injections. The authors show that
that wholesale debt, Tier 1 ratio, commercial loans and the state macro index growth
are all factors that predict a bank’s participation decision to the programme. They also
point out that large banks are more likely to be accepted into the TARP CCP. This is
in line with Croci et al. (2015), who find that commercial and industrial loans, credit
risk, non-performing loans, cost inefficiencies, goodwill and size enhance the probability
of being accepted for TARP-CCP.
In order to have annual data, we compute a 4 quarter moving average. The dependent
variable is forecasted one year ahead. Therefore, all explanatory variables are measured
one year in advance, with respect to the year in which the dependent variable is observed.
To avoid multicollinearity in the regression models, we remove the explanatory variables
with the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) higher than 5. We initially consider 37 variables;
only 22 of them are significant at the level of 5% or low in at least one GEV model. The
list of the variables included in the models is reported below:
• Holding: a dummy variable that equals one if the bank is part of a bank holding
company, otherwise it is zero;
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• EQTA: equity over total assets;
• Size: logarithm of total assets;
• Other RE: all other direct and indirect investments in real estate over total asset;
• C&I Loans: commercial and industrial loans over total assets;
• ROA: net income over total assets;
• Loans: loans and leases, net unearned income and allowance over total assets;
• ROE: net income over total equity;
• NIM: net interest income over total assets;
• Non Interest Income 1: non-interest income over operating income;
• Non Interest Income 2: non-interest income over total assets;
• Loan Loss Reserves: loan loss allowance over total assets;
• Tier 1 Ratio: Tier 1 over risky assets,
• Liquidity: federal funds purchased in domestic offices net of funds sold in domestic
offices over total assets;
• Non Performing Loans: past due and nonaccrual loans over total assets;
• Brokered deposit: brokered deposit over total assets;
• Cost Inefficiency: noninterest expenses over non-interest income and interest in-
come;
• Age: Difference between sample year and the year of opening;
• GDP: GDP growth rate at the state level;
• UR: unemployment rate at the state level;
• PI: personal income growth rate at the state level.
We apply the GEV model by estimating the equation (3.1) using the maximum
likelihood method. The estimation procedure is implemented in the R package BGEVA
(Marra et al., 2014) available on CRAN. Table 2 reports the findings of the GEV model
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for the probability of failure and the probability of receiving capital injection in 2008
and 2009.
Variables
2008 2009
failure TARP-CPP TARP-CPP
Holding -0.23(***) -2.89(***)
EQTA
Size 0.17(***) 0.14(***)
Other RE -6.21(*) -5.44(*)
C&I Loans 1.11(***) 1.47(***)
ROA
Loans 0.69(***)
ROE -0.80(***)
NIM -17.60(***)
Non Interest Income 1 0.004 (***)
Non Interest Income 2
Cost Inefficiency
Loan Loss Reserves 46.03 (***)
Tier 1 ratio -58.84 (***) -2.84(***)
Liquidity -18.95(***)
Nonperforming Loans 15.97(***) -2.05(***)
Brokered Deposit
Age -0.11(*)
GDP
UR 0.04(***)
PI 20.89(**) 15.96(***)
Table 2: The estimates of the GEV model for the probability of failure and the probability of receiving capital
injection in 2008 and 2009 in the US. The number of ”*” denotes the significant level: (***) is p ≤ 0.000, (**)
is p ≤ 0.001, (*) is p ≤ 0.01.
In line with previous studies (e.g. Wheelock & Wilson, 2000; Cole & White, 2012;
DeYoung & Torna, 2013) our results show that banks with less liquidity (Loan Loss
Reserves over total loans), low asset quality (nonperforming loans), poor performance
(ROE) and low capitalization (Tier 1 ratio) were more likely to fail in 2008. We also
find that banks with high non-traditional income sources (Non -interest income 1) had
a high probability of failing. In this regards, DeYoung & Torna (2013) point out that
banks that engage in risky nontraditional activities are more likely to take risks in their
traditional lines of business.
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Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2 report the determinants for receiving the capital injection
in 2008 or 2009. Banks with large commercial and industrial loans (C&I Loans) and low
real estate (Other RE) were more likely to be bailed out in 2008 and 2009. This finding
is unsurprising given that loans are typically the least liquid and riskiest assets. In line
with the paradigm too big to fail, large banks were more likely to receive capital injection.
In addition, we find that bank holding company membership reduced the probability of
capital injection in 2008. As pointed out by Berger & Bouwman (2013), commercial
banks can benefit from the financial support provided by the holding company and
therefore there is less need to get further funds. In 2009, banks that invested more in a
tradition portfolio of activities (high loans over total assets) and that suffered from an
economic viewpoint (low net interest margin) had a high probability of receiving capital
injection. Finally, concerning the macroeconomic variables, banks located in the States
with high personal income growth rate (PI) and unemployment rate (UR) were more
likely to be bailed out.
Table 3 displays the determinants of the probability of failure conditionally to the
event intervention (Ii = 1) and non-intervention (Ii = 0) and the relative explicative
variables for the period post-intervention 2010−2013. Capitalisation level (EQTA, equity
over total assets) appears to be an important variable to reduce the probability of failing
for the banks that received capital injection for all the years under investigation. Instead,
Size was associated with a high probability of failing for all the banks in 2012, while
only for the banks that did not receive TARP-CPP in 2011. As concerns the probability
conditionally to the non-intervention (Ii = 0), low capitalisation (EQTA, Tier 1 ratio),
and performance (ROA) were key variables for the occurrence of the failure in 2010-2011.
Liquidity appears to diminish the probability of failing of the banks that received capital
injection in 2012. Moreover, as in 2008, total non-interest income and nonperforming
loans were both important predictive variables for bankruptcy in 2010. The excessive
increase of non-interest expenses and the reduction of the interest income sources have
then impacted negatively on the probability of failure (cost inefficiency) subsequently in
2011 and 2013. Finally, with regards to the macroeconomic variables, banks with high
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personal income growth rate were more likely to fail in the States in 2010 and 2013.
4.3 Did the TARP CPP increase the stability of the bank-
ing system?
In this section we analyse the effectiveness of TARP-CPP in increasing banking stabil-
ity. To achieve this aim, we apply the LOBGEV model proposed in this paper6 This
model allows us to estimate the type and the level of dependence between the distress
probabilities over time.
Specifically, we apply the GEV model, presented in section 3.1, to all the banks
in 2008 and to the two groups of banks - those that received capital injections and
those that did not - for each year from 2009 to 2013. The dependent variable is bank
failure or non-failure in a given year. Using the parameters estimates of the GEV
model, we assess the distress probabilities P (D2008 = 1), P (Dt = 1|I = 0) and P (Dt =
1|I = 1) for t = 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013. Afterwards, we measure the dependence
between the distress probability in 2008 P (D2008 = 1) and the conditional probability
P (Dt = 1|I = 0) or P (Dt = 1|I = 1) after the intervention (2010-2013) using the D-vine
copula described in section 3.2. The level of dependence is given by the association
copula parameter θt,j defined in section 3.3. To evaluate the effectiveness of the capital
injections, we analyse the temporal structure of the failure probabilities for the banks
that benefit from TARP-CPP interventions P (Dt = 1|I = 1) and for those that did not
receive such funds P (Dt = 1|I = 0).
The pair-copula families that maximise the Goodness of Fit Test or the Akaike infor-
mation criterion are chosen in order to provide the best fit to the data. Gaussian copula
achieves the best fit to data if we are interested in modelling the dependence structure
between the failure probability in 2008 and the same probability in 2010, 2011, 2012
and 2013 for both non-TARP and TARP recipients. Since the estimated pair-copulae
are Gaussian, the dependence between the failure probabilities is linear. Instead, we ob-
tained that different pair-copula families, such as the Student-t and the Gumbel copulae,
6The LOGBEV model is implemented in R and the code is available upon request from the authors.
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provide the best fit to data if we model the dependence between the failure probabilities
after the beginning of the implementation of the TARP-CPP programme, i.e. from 2009
to 2013. It is interesting that both Student-t and the Gumbel copulae show a tail de-
pendence, in the first framework the tail dependence is linear, in the latter it is an upper
tail dependence. Table 4 reports the association parameter estimates of the Gaussian
copula, that are the intensity of the dependence of the failures probabilities over time for
the two groups of banks that were either included or not in the TARP-CPP programme.
At the first glance, we note that in 2010 the TARP-CPP programme consistently de-
crease the default probability dependence with the default of probability in October
2008, when the programme was launched. Specifically, in 2010, the correlation between
the P (Dt = 1|I = 1) and P (D2008 = 1) was 0.04 while those for the P (Dt = 1|I = 0)
and P (D2008 = 1) was 0.4286. This result suggests that the TARP-CPP programme has
provided an immediate relief to the banks enrolled in the programme through a decrease
of their probability of failing. However, the correlation between the P (Dt = 1|I = 1)
in 2011 and P (D2008 = 1) was 0.1330 and higher in 2012, 0.2254. In the same manner,
the correlation between the P (Dt = 0|I = 1) in 2012 and P (D2008 = 1) has increased.
In 2013, the correlation between both P (Dt = 1|I = 1) and P (Dt = 1|I = 0), and
P (D2008 = 1) have reached almost the same level (respectively, 0.0753 and 0.0923).
These results potentially have important and significant implications. In particular,
capital injections helped banks to reduce their default probabilities in the short term.
However, such an effect is less strong after 2010 until 2012, when banks that did not
receive capital injections show similar patterns. This suggests that the TARP was effec-
tive in reducing the default probability especially during the peak of the global financial
crisis. Our findings are in line with Berger & Bouwman (2013)’s paper, which shows that
capital is an effective tool in enhancing banks performance (in terms also of survival as
distance to default) especially during crises and economic downfall. The effectiveness of
the TARP programme in the short term could be due to the competitive advantages and
the increase of market shares and market power for the TARP banks, as shown by Berger
& Roman (2015). From 2010, the dependences between the probabilities of defaults for
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banks that were either supported or not by the TARP-CPP programme are similar. We
find two main reasons to explain these results. Firstly, typically large banks with high
market power have appeared to have taken on more risk as a consequence of capital in-
jections during the TARP programme, as pointed out by Berger & Roman (2015), Black
& Hazelwood (2013) and Duchin & Sosyura (2014). Secondly, TARP banks could have
struggled with the costs of TARP-funds which could have harmed their market power
and soundness (Berger & Roman, 2015).
In addition, we find a linear dependence structure between the probabilities of failure
in 2008 and after that. This means that the likelihood of failure after 2008 depends on
the level of distress of the bank at the peak of the financial crisis for non-TARP and
TARP recipients, regardless of whether a bank is healthy or not. On the contrary, after
2008, the dependence between the probabilities of failure becomes a tail dependence for
the two groups of bank. These results could be due to a distortion of the financial market
caused by the government support. As shown by Black & Hazelwood (2013) and Duchin
& Sosyura (2014), banks that receive government assistance tend to increase their risk
taking for both lending and investment activities as a general attitude. For this reason,
we find that the time series of the probabilities of failures after 2008 show dependence
only for distressed TARP banks. Duchin & Sosyura (2014) also show that a higher risk
attitude is associated more with a signal of government support rather than with the
capital injection itself. In line with our results, they specifically find that a higher risk-
taking attitude is more evident for banks that are closer to financial distress or that were
allowed to skipped dividend payments required by the TARP programme. Furthermore,
banks learned about the government forbearance attitude during the running of the
TARP-CPP programme (over the period 2008-2009). Therefore, it is reasonable to find
a different risk-attitude for a specific group of banks after the beginning of the TARP
programme. As pointed out by Berger & Roman (2015), market power banks, which are
typically the large ones, appear to have taken on more risk because of capital injection
during the TARP programme. This means that banks with higher risk exposure tended
to take on more risk after 2008. In addition, it is plausible to find a tail dependence
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Time Dependence between Dependence between
P (Dt = 1|I = 1) and P (D2008 = 1) P (Dt = 1|I = 0) and P (D2008 = 1)
2009-2008 0.6548 0.7858
2010-2008/2009 0.0443 0.4286
2011-2008/(2009-10) 0.1330 0.0691
2012-2008/(2009-10-11) 0.2254 0.1955
2013-2008/(2009-10-11-12) 0.0753 0.0923
Table 4: The level of dependence between the failure probability P (D2008 = 1) and the conditional failure
probabilities P (Dt = 1|I = 0) or P (Dt = 1|I = 1) for the two groups of banks that are included and not in
the TARP-CPP project for the period 2009-2013.
for the non-TARP recipients after the peak of the financial crisis. These banks were
not considered sufficiently healthy or systemically important to be integrated in the
programme. Hence, the distressed and the healthy banks maintain their risk performance
after the beginning of the implementation of the TARP-CPP programme, i.e. from 2009
to 2013.
5 Conclusion
The 2008 financial crisis has highlighted the importance of reliable and robust models
to monitor and assess banks’ stability in order to reduce the social costs of failures and
rescue policies. This issue is of particular interest because the financial crisis has led
to a vast amount of costly policy interventions to stabilize the financial system. While
these initiatives have provided relief to the banking system, their effects on the stability
of the banking system over a prolonged period of time is still controversial. Bailouts can
favour moral hazard behaviour of banks and in turn increase their risk profile over time
(Hakenes & Schnabel, 2010; Dam & Koetter, 2012; Black & Hazelwood, 2013; Duchin
& Sosyura, 2014). Even though there is an increasing number of studies on capital
injections to banks during the financial crisis, the effectiveness of bailouts in reducing
the probability of failure over time is relatively unexplored.
This paper contributes to the operational research literature by covering this gap. In
particular, we propose a new longitudinal model for binary rare events, the Longitudinal
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Binary Generalised Extreme Value (LOBGEV) model. This model uses the GEV model
(Calabrese & Osmetti, 2013) to represent the marginal distributions of the D-vine copula
(Smith et al., 2010). We employ this new model to analyse the impact of the TARP-
CPP capital injections on the probability of failure of US commercial banks from 2008
to 2013. Our results provide three important empirical contributions.
First, using the GEV model, we analyse the determinants of receiving capital injec-
tions under the TARP-CPP and of bank failures over the period 2008-2009. Our results
show that low liquidity, low asset quality, poor performance and low capitalization, high
non-traditional income sources increase the probability of bank distress. Moreover, we
find that banks with high commercial and industrial loans, large size, and low real estate
are more likely to be bailed-out.
Second, we apply the GEV model to identify the characteristics that are relevant to
describe banks’ failure after the TARP-CPP projects. Our findings show that higher
levels of capitalisation reduce the probability of bankruptcy for banks that received
TARP-CPP funds for all the years under investigation. Moreover, both capitalisation
and performance of banks are pivotal variables for the distress probability conditionally
to the non-intervention. As concerns the macroeconomic variables, US banks with high
personal income growth rate were less likely to fail in 2010 and 2013.
Third, we propose the LOBGEV model to investigate the temporal dependence struc-
ture of the failure probabilities for banks that received TARP-CPP capital injections and
for those that did not. This new model can be used by regulators and policy makers to
assess the effectiveness of capital injections over time in improving banks performance.
In particular, our investigation is driven by a simple but powerful question: did the
TARP-CPP programme reduce banks default probabilities? Our results suggest that,
after an initial relief, the correlation between the probabilities of failure for TARP-CPP
recipients over a period of five years is almost the same as the correlation for banks that
did not receive capital injections. Therefore, the TARP-CPP programme was effective
in reducing banks default probabilities only in the short term, during the peak of the
global financial crisis.
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